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and how to adopt enterprise systems? 
 
ABSTRACT    
Corporate investment in enterprise level IT systems has been characterised by high rates of failure.  
The paper presents a knowledge based perspective to examine how firms adopt and implement 
enterprise systems in order to better understand how organisations can achieve reliable outcomes from 
such investments. The case presented explores the key decision stages of a major ERP investment, 
focusing on the strategic reasoning behind each decision. Particular attention is directed to the 
relationship between adoption know-why and implementation know-how to assess whether managers 
have been mindful or mindless in their investment decisions. 
 
Keywords: Information technology adoption, Enterprise Resource Planning, decision making, know-
how, know-why 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The decision to adopt an Enterprise System (ES) has become one of the most time-consuming and 
risky strategic decisions for a top management team (Sawyer, 2001) In particular, large scale 
Enterprise Systems such as ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning), CRM (Customer Relationship 
Management) and SCM (Supply Chain Management) involve considerable organisational resources.  
For example, the average cost of ERP implementation is $10.6 million and takes 24 months to 
complete (Summer, 2005). Research conducted by the Meta Group (Stein, 1999) also indicates that 
90% of ERP projects are late or over budget. Problems with ES investment arise for a host of reasons: 
hardware and software may fail to meet specifications; the vendor may promise product functionality 
that is not deliverable; requirements can be poorly specified; operational implementation 
methodologies can fail and personality and political interference can come into play (Barki, Rivard et 
al., 1993; Keil, Cule et al., 1998; Keil and Montealegre, 2000). Given the risks, it is understandable 
that managers would feel uncertain about ES adoption and the subsequent exposure to public scrutiny 
that may result from expensive investments that may or may not achieve reliable outcomes moreover 
produce performance improvements.  
The process of ERP adoption is one where the individual begins with innovation comprehension and 
then progresses through to organisation assimilation (Swanson and Ramiller, 2004). In order to deliver 
reliable innovation outcomes the organisation must make a number of key strategic decisions 
encompassing the adoption, implementation and assimilation stages. These decisions comprise 
choosing the right system and the right system scope (know-why); and choosing the right 
implementation strategy (know-how). Yet, is by no means clear that managers engage in a deliberate 
and considered way when making decisions about whether, when and how to invest in IT programs 
(Swanson and Wang, 2005; Coltman and Dolnicar, 2006). 
In this paper we explore this issue by investigating the decision to invest in ERP software throughout a 
large manufacturing organisation. We begin with a higher order conceptual framework that enables us 
to examine the complex decision making processes involved in the innovation process.  Particular 
attention is focussed on those innovation processes, informed by adoption know-why and 
implementation know-how.  The methodologies used to capture the data for this case study are 
discussed before presenting our preliminary findings.  
2. MINDFUL IT ADOPTION 
The study draws on the concepts of organisation mindfulness, sense-making and enactment as 
proposed by Weick (1995), Daneels (2003) and Swanson et. al (1995; 2005). This conceptual work 
provides a novel and more complete theoretical framework to understand ES adoption processes and 
outcomes. Essentially these theories suggest that reliable performance outcomes can be attributed to 
how managers think; how they gather information and how they perceive the external environment. 
Yet, one of the most consistent findings emerging from organisational decision research is that people 
have very little time for problem solving and when they do undertake these activities, they tend to 
display considerable irrationality (Brunsson, 1985). They make inferential errors, create myths to 
account for uncertainty, and are resistant to feedback (March, 1991).  In other words, scant reasoning 
may characterize IT related investments such as ERP―with subsequent implications for firm 
performance. We see evidence of this in the work by Swanson and Ramiller (2004) where they 
suggest that “mindful and mindless” behaviour tends to characterise IT investment decisions.   
2.1 Capturing Mindfulness 
Mindful and mindless behaviour is a way of working that is grounded in the minds of participating 
individuals (managers) through a process of heedful interrelating (Weick and Roberts, 1993). In the 
case of ERP investment decisions, heedful interrelating arises as managers interpret and act upon a 
model of a changing environment and organizational situation: how they gather information; how they 
perceive the world around them; and whether they are able to change their perspective to reflect the 
situation at hand (Langer, 1989). Mindfulness is “manifested in active information processing, 
characterised by the creation and refinement of categories and distinctions and the awareness of 
multiple perspectives” (Fiol and O'Connor, 2003: 59).  
In terms of IT adoption, mindfulness is a novel approach to understanding how organisations make 
sense of IT innovation. Swanson and Ramiller (2004) conceptualise the process of IT innovation as 
having 4 phases: comprehension, adoption, implementation and assimilation. Managers are faced with 
key decisions at each phase, which become interdependent due to the mental models managers have 
around these processes in order to make sense of them. Research which has focused on 
implementation know-how as the key to innovation success has ignored the fact that if a technology is 
adopted for the wrong reasons the potential to gain sustainable competitive advantage is limited. 
Likewise, if managers are not mindful of the path dependent nature of adoption rationales their 
strategic reasoning becomes limited by their past decision-making. In other words, managers need to 
be mindful of the way they make sense of a technology.  This requires one to consider the way IT fits 
with the current organisation vision and environment, as distinct to past patterns of organisational 
behaviour (Swanson and Ramillier, 2004).  
2.1.1 The impact of managerial know-why and know-how on IT innovation 
Swanson and Wang (2005), in a study of 118 firms, investigate adoption know-why and 
implementation know-how. Their research found that strategic reasoning (know-why) is important to 
the outcomes of the organisation during IT adoption. However, empirical justification for this obvious 
finding has received very little empirical attention. To date, research in the strategy field has relied on 
contextual factors, such as organisation size to determine performance success. Furthermore, Swanson 
and Wang’s study suggests that implementation know-how by itself does not necessarily lead to 
innovation success. Additionally having know-how does not necessarily mean the organisation has a 
solid business rationale for adoption in the first place. What Swanson and Wang’s study found was 
that business coordination (the ability to better communication across departments and enterprise-
wide, with customers and suppliers), was a key know-why factor in innovation success. However, the 
research was limited in that they did not observe directly the adoption and implementation processes, 
nor did they gather the perceptions of managers at different levels in the organisation, relying solely 
on the CIO for the judgemental data. Lastly the research was conducted during the 1990’s and as such 
could be considered an historical case, set in a period, prior to the 2000 era of the dot.com bust.  
2.2 The Enactment Process: Conceptualising the Decision-Making Process 
Hambrick and Mason (1984)  recognised that organisational outcomes may well be a reflection of 
bounded rational cognitions of the “powerful actors in the organisation” (p193). Our research also 
recognises that we cannot operate under the assumption that organisations are entirely purposeful 
entities especially when it comes to strategic decision-making.  
However, the strategy literature has tended to ignore the mental models managers have about their 
organization, relying on a rational view of organisation behaviour to determine organisation outcomes. 
The assumption is that managers behave as rational actors (Johnson and Hoopes, 2003). Under this 
premise–dominated by an economic perspective on strategy–managers are seen as “rational utility 
maximisers” (Stubbart, 1989). This view ignores the role managers’ play in determining strategic 
choice and resulting firm performance levels (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Thus, organisation 
research needs to focus on the dominant coalition of an organisation, or to be more specific its top 
managers. By focusing on top managers, we can determine organisational action as a function of the 
capacities of specific individuals (Miller, Kets De Vries et al., 1982).  Not only do we need to focus on 
top managers, we need to uncover how managerial perceptions inform adoption know-why and 
implementation know-how because the process of strategic reasoning is driven by the mental models 
managers create about an IT innovation. 
2.3 Conceptual Framework 
The enactment framework provides a comprehensive process through which one can examine both the 
adoption know-why and implementation know-how. Daneels (2003) work conceptualises the process 
of enactment as a cyclical process of interaction with customers, or in this case the process of firm 
interactions leading to ES adoption and implementation (see Figure 1). The model represents an 
‘information processing sequence in which individuals attend to cues in their environment, interpret 
the meanings of such cues and externalise these interpretations through concrete activities’ (Porac, 
Thomas et al., 1989:398). 
Figure 1: Enactment Framework as Applied to the ES Adoption Process 
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Our research argues that firms build knowledge and form mental models about IT innovations through 
internal and external environmental pressures, such as their experiences with the innovation in the past 
and the experiences of firms external to them (e.g. press around large IT failures and bandwagon 
behaviour), they interpret this information (forming mental models and adoption know-why), make 
current implementation decisions and also future innovation choices (evaluating the fit of future 
technologies). 
In this context then for an organisation seeking reliable outcomes from IT adoption, mindfulness 
concerns managing expectations in dynamic, unpredictable environments, so that managers should 
continuously scrutinise expectations and adjust according to a process of continual learning (Weick 
and Sutcliffe, 2001). 
Using the enactment framework the research examines how managers perceive the environmental cues 
which drive their decision to adopt an enterprise system. We also examine what drives the decision to 
adopt implementation strategies and how the outcomes of previous technology investments have 
impacted on the current and future adoption processes. For example, we demonstrate how negative 
investment experiences have impacted on current ERP adoption. We also examine whether managers 
have made mindful decisions and the impact of this on the outcomes of the innovation process. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
The research employs a single case study of the largest ever single ERP roll-out in Australia, to date.  
The study’s focus is a complex set of strategic decisions, made at different levels of the organisation, 
which are clearly contextually bound. With that in mind a case study approach allows us to cover the 
contextual conditions of the decisions made, while at the same time develop a deep understanding of 
the making process. 
Swanson and Ramiller (2004) have suggested that because “context matters in rendering judgments” 
(p559) a case study is the best methodology to examine contextual based effects of IT decision 
making. Furthermore, Fiol and Conner (2003) argue that mindful decision making involves making 
strategic choices which best fit the specific organisation circumstance, rather than familiar behaviours 
based on what others are doing.  
A case study methodology is further justified by (Yin 1994: 7), who purports that why and how 
questions are suited to a case study methodology because “these questions deal with operational links 
[that need] to be traced over time”. The organisational case study will allow us to “…probe both the 
know-why brought to bear on adoption and the know-how brought to bear on implementation and 
assimilation, as well as the interplay between both forms of knowledge” (Swanson and Wang, 2005, 
p29). 
3.1 A Multi-Level Embedded Case Study Design  
The case study has an embedded design based around data collection from the different decision-
making teams at different levels in the organisation (see Figure 2), thus employing a multi-level 
analysis within a single study (Eisenhardt, 1989). These groups played different roles corresponding to 
the phases of the ERP adoption, from comprehension through to assimilation. 
A triangulated approach to data collection provides the case study with an ability to ‘substantiate 
constructs’ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 538). The case study will use qualitative methods, mainly in-depth 
interviews and quantitative methods, best-worst analysis, to collect and analyse data.  
This combination of research methods will allow us to both describe the relationship between the 
strategic decisions made at different stages of the ERP project (comprehension, adoption, 
implementation and assimilation), determine whether mindful decision-making has impacted on the 
project outcomes and start to explain the drivers of the decisions at different stages, with a view to 
being able to predict project outcomes (a future research initiative). 
Figure 2: ERP Project Structure 
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3.1.1 Qualitative approach: phase 1 
To gather rich descriptive information on the adoption process we use convergent interview 
techniques. Convergent interviewing combines the advantages of unstructured and structured 
interviews. It does this by leaving the content unstructured (i.e. not asking a predefined set of 
questions) but uses a tight structure to collect the information, through systematic sampling, data 
collection and interpretation (Dick, 1998). 
To further bolster the case study findings multiple investigators are used to conduct the in-depth 
interviews. As Eisenhardt (1989) suggests the use of multiple investigators serves two purposes. The 
first purpose is to enhance data richness and the likelihood of novel insights through complementary 
insights. The second is to increase the confidence in the findings, through convergence of observations 
and the possibility of conflicting views. In practice this has been carried out through pairs of 
researchers making visits to the case study sight. Each researcher writes notes on the respondents and 
observes body language and these notes are then compared post interview. Field notes are also being 
kept which will help in the analysis stage where they can be used to shape the semantic mapping. 
All ERP decision-making constructs have been identified from the literature and pilot interviews 
conducted prior to data collection, to help drive the data collection. This method was used by 
Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) in their study of top management team strategic decision-making. 
However, it is important to note that part of this phase of the research emphasises finding novel and 
unforseen constructs, given the unique context of the study and the novel theoretical framework being 
applied (Eisenhardt, 1989). The convergent interview technique discussed emphasises the focus on 
capturing unforseen concepts. 
The next stage of the qualitative phase will use content analysis to develop semantic maps of the 
decisions that individuals and teams have made at different phases of the process.  
3.1.1.1 Cognitive Mapping 
Cognitive mapping techniques, namely semantic mapping, is used to elicit individual beliefs or mental 
models regarding the ERP adoption process in phase 1. Cognitive mapping techniques have been 
applied in strategic management settings to explore managerial cognition (Siau and Xin, 2005). 
Cognitive mapping was developed by Toleman (1948) a researcher in psychology, to describe an 
individual’s internal mental representation of concepts and their relationship. Substantial research 
using cognitive mapping to explore managerial cognition, highlights the technique as an effective way 
to understand managerial judgment (for e.g. Huff, 1990; Fiol and Huff, 1992; Walsh, 1995). The maps 
provide a graphical representation of respondents’ mental models, which allow researchers to: 1) elicit 
concepts; 2) refine concepts; and 3) identify relationships between concepts. 
This research uses semantic mapping to explore the concepts surrounding managerial decision-
making, without superimposing structures (Buzan, 1993). The in-depth interview transcripts are 
analysed using content analysis software called Leximancer© to create the semantic concept maps. 
This allows us to examine both salient concepts and the relationships between concepts. Leximancer© 
software is used to ensure consistent coding of the interview transcripts, which will lead to a more 
reliable construct derivation (Weber, 1990). 
3.1.2 Quantitative approach: phase 2  
The outcome of the content analysis provides a better defined list of constructs but is still not clear 
how much weight should be given to the different factors involved in decision making. One of the 
biggest challenges in determining the relative importance of a set of factors across individuals is the 
existence of scalar inequivalence (Cohen, 2003).  Scalar inequivalence arises primarily because of 
differences in response styles which are defined as “tendencies to respond systematically to 
questionnaire items on some basis other than what the times were specifically designed to measure” 
(Paulhus, 1991: 17). To overcome this problem the best-worst scaling (BWS) approach is used. BWS 
is a multiple-choice extension of the paired comparison approach that is scale-free and forces 
respondents to make a discriminating choice among the factors under consideration.  
BWS is a fairly general scaling method that extends Thurstone’s (1927) Random Utility Theory-to 
judgments of the largest/smallest, best/worst, most/least etc. items, objects or cues.  Specifically, the 
BWS assumes that there is some underlying subjective dimension, such as “degree of importance”, 
“degree of concern”, “degree of interest” etc. and the researcher wishes to measure the location or 
position of some set of objects, factors etc. on that underlying dimension.  Thus, the scales derived 
from BWS are those that best satisfy a theory about the way in which individuals make best-worst 
judgments (Marley and Louviere, 2005). This allows us to determine the preference ordering of a large 
number of attributes associated with the ERP project decisions. 
3.2 An Outline of the Case of a Manufacturing Company Innovating with ERP 
In 2002, an Australian division (called division A for anonymity) of a large manufacturing 
organisation began a preliminary investigation of ways to replace their legacy systems with a 
comprehensive ERP system. At this time, the company was watching a Moovex implementation go 
horribly wrong in Asia―another organisation division. Coupled with this were concerns over profit 
warnings and the ongoing struggles of other organisations dealing with ERP failures. This created a 
very risky environment for the organisation’s executive team who were acutely aware of the problems 
any negative press regarding an ERP botch up would cause them. Perhaps not surprisingly, the project 
was put on the backburner.  
Whilst division A had been initiating ERP discussions so too was the industrial markets division 
(made up of an Australian business unit (hereon in unit B) and a NZ unit). The business started an 
initiative called Project Wyatt (which later became 1SAP) to create an integrated ERP system across 
the various strategic business units and divisions. External partners and business consultants, such as 
Accenture and CSC were brought into the process to help capture business and system requirements. 
Two software packages, SAP (Release 3) and Moovex ERP were reviewed for their fit with the 
Industrial Markets unit.  During initial reviews it soon became obvious to the TMT that Moovex was a 
3rd tier system, suited to mid-range organisations, much along the lines of the Asian installation. SAP 
had stronger capabilities in the business unit’s key markets and already had a small footprint in 
division A and a large footprint in unit B who had already implemented SAP Release 2. 
At the time of the Project Wyatt investigation a new CEO joined the organisation. The CEO baulked at 
cost approximations for project Wyatt (somewhere around $80 million). The organisation had just 
finished acquiring a U.S company, had recently moved into the Asian market and was interested in 
spending money on capital equipment not IT. Needless to say project Wyatt again stalled in Australia. 
It was at this time that New Zealand unit saw an opportunity to take up the ERP project. The business 
case for NZ was very strong coupled with the fact that the NZ implementation would be much smaller 
than their Australian counterparts. They were running with legacy systems, some departments were 
soon to be closed and they had endured in the past, unpredictable business performance. The 
environment for NZ, coupled with a lower budget approval, meant they could get the go ahead from 
the executive. The implementation at NZ signalled to the other business units that ERP upgrades may 
be possible across the board and the 1SAP project was borne (a reincarnation of project Wyatt which 
had previously been canned).  
In 2004, Australia once again initiated a comprehensive risk review. The objective was to report to the 
Senior Leadership Team at unit B of any inherent risk associated with their aging software (i.e., SAP 
Release 2). The core problem was that SAP had warned unit B that support for R2 would cease in 
December 2004. The team had to go through extensive processes in order to gain management support 
for a system upgrade to R3. The organisation design and culture made this process more difficult. The 
business had introduced a new governance concept coined ‘syndication’ that sought to introduce a 
structure of decision by consensus. The effect of this new method of governance was that all decisions 
whether large strategic decisions or tiny design issues must endure arduous consensus based decision-
making processes. 
The working committee which was formed to conduct the project pre-feasibility and feasibility studies 
endured the bureaucratic process and eventually garnered management support, using a risk mitigation 
argument. The fact that NZ had just implemented a SAP system provided a convenient platform for 
unit B to leverage off. Essentially the NZ project became a pilot test for unit B, who implemented a 
NZ equivalent in their own business unit. The fact that senior organisation and unit B managers had 
seen the overall success of NZ, helped the working committee garner necessary executive level 
support. 
As a standalone ERP implementation the unit B project was very successful. It is a rare that such a 
large project involving 2000 users, 70 interfaces with other systems, interstate users and the largest 
organisation business unit can proclaim such success. A lot of the success of unit B has also been 
attributed to the front-end loading that took place before the project sign off occurred (developing 
know-why for adoption). Approximately 1/3 of the total budget was assigned to the pre-feasibility and 
feasibility stages of the project, to ensure a full evaluation of options and the creation of system 
prototypes to enable a good organisation fit. Furthermore, the success can also be attributed to 
effective change management and operational support. Essentially the unit had great implementation 
know-how from past implementations in unit B and other business units. People involved in these past 
projects were brought in on the R3 project. 
Since the NZ and unit B implementations the 1SAP program is continuing in its bid to standardise 
business processes and practice across the plants. The vision is to remove ‘the islands of 
responsibility’ currently evident in maintenance for example and improved business coordination. 
However the 1SAP program, which aims to get all business units on the same system, has not been 
successful. They are yet to be able to get the division A project off the ground-in terms of gaining 
management support.  
3.2.1 Preliminary discussion applying the case to the enactment framework 
It is evident from the case study that internal and external pressures on the organisation influence the 
way executives comprehend ERP in their organisation. As a whole, the organisation perceived ERP as 
a risky endeavour. This was understandable given the high rates of ERP failure reported in the popular 
press and the internal failures that had plagued the company over many years. In terms of adoption 
know-why, the working committee had a huge job on their hands in overcoming some of the executive 
perceptions around ERP technology. For instance, avoidance and risk aversion mentalities were well 
entrenched in the organisation. We see evidence of this in the reluctance by particular senior 
executives to accept the inherent risk of staying with an unsupported system and persevering with 
unreliable contract support.  
3.2.2  1SAP: know-why 
According to Swanson and Wang (2005) business benefits should provide the framework for 
constructing and articulating an organisation’s adoption know-why. Hence, senior management 
perceptions of the business benefits attainable are critical to IT investment.  
In the beginning, it was obvious that senior management had difficulties seeing any real business 
benefits in innovating with ERP.  One of the main reasons for this was that they were used to investing 
in plant equipment and constructing engineering systems that produced tangible output and were 
connected to their core business activities. According to the I/S Manager “the senior view is that I/S 
isn’t about making [our products]. They thought we should be able to employ contactors who knew 
about R2…the problem with I/S is that you can’t see it [wear].” 
In fact the organisation’s senior executives were content with being followers not leaders in ERP, 
waiting essentially for the technology to be thrust upon them, as a senior VP stated “let someone else 
go first” and “ if the systems still running why change.” It actually took a formal letter from SAP 
telling business unit B that support would cease, to convince them the upgrade was necessary.  
As Swanson and Ramiller (2004) suggest mindless decisions are a result of organisations paying little 
attention to this early stage of technology comprehension, particularly the case where an organisation 
believes IT is not critical to the business. When mindless organisations adopt ERP packages they often 
rely on the dominant vendor and follow a ‘best practice’ standard of implementing a vanilla system.  
Mindless decision-making is certainly existent in the case presented, where the organisation was 
content to follow preserved organisation routines, based on prior experience with engineering system 
projects. Furthermore, unit B implemented a vanilla SAP system highlighting again the point that  
their decision to adopt ERP was not driven by attention to organisational specifics or distinctive 
competencies. In fact the process of strategic reasoning was based around principles which drive the 
entire organisation’s capital investment management process. An extensive time period and budget 
(approximately 1/3 of total costs) was spent on the pre-feasibility and feasibility stages of the project, 
which the organisation has coined as front-end loading. A senior consultant claimed that the 
investment management process was designed for engineering style projects and does not fit with ERP 
projects. The problem occurring with front-end loading, in both unit B and currently with division A, 
is knowing when to stop the design process and ask for more funds, ‘’[this process] is not something 
other organisations do…how far do you go into your design before you stop and reassess’’ (Senior 
Accenture Consultant).  
Whilst the focus on risk avoidance, through extensive front-end loading, shows evidence of 
mindfulness, the organisation’s inability to acknowledge that trade-offs need to be made between 
schedule, budget and delivered functionality, imparts a sense of mindlessness. Swanson and Ramiller 
(2004) claim that the mindful organisation favours improvisation over planning and adaptation over 
routine, in order to remain resilient to the likelihood that when innovating with any form of IT, 
realised strategies will be departed from initial strategic planning. To a large extent this was not the 
case with the unit B project, whereby routines and past patterns of behaviour were closely followed 
and relied upon. Consultants working on the project indicate that the decision making by syndication 
process the organisation has deployed to insure them against all risk, meant the approval process was 
“dragged out [wasting] a lot of time and dollars”. The executive team were not willing to be mindful 
of the fact that flexibility needs to be exercised for decisions of different consequences- on the 
contrary they applied the same framework to high level adoption decisions, such as scope choice as 
well as very minor design issues. In terms of being opportunistic and learning from the process, 
division A’s current inability to get past the front-end loading stages, suggests otherwise. This could 
be the case of the organisation taking a very narrow view of the 1SAP project, believing that because 
unit B was successful as a standalone project they can continue following the same processes for 
future initiatives. The organisation does not recognise that to innovate mindfully, a trade-off needs to 
be made between acknowledging the inherent risks of ERP projects and being able to relax formal 
structures to ensure action, in terms of rolling out the 1SAP project. 
To further complicate the enterprise wide 1SAP project, the organisation governance structure is 
federated. In other words the strategic business units can agree in principal to be involved in the 
project, but at a business unit level they still have the final say. Thus not only does the 1SAP program 
need to gain the executive leadership team’s (ELT) support they need to gain the support of the senior 
leadership team (SLT) in each business unit. Due to the syndication process, if one of the SLT’s 
disagrees with the project scope and budget the ELT will not move forward. The impact of this is 
visible by the time that it took to get the executive team on board.  In fact, it has taken business unit B, 
4-5 times longer to adopt and implement an off-the-shelf ERP package than it has other successful 
organisations―innovating with the same technology enterprise wide―such as BHP Billiton and BP 
(Senior Accenture Consultant). 
This decision making governance structure imposes problems on getting commitment from executives 
and has served to stall the 1SAP project. Again in this instance it appears that the organisation is 
acting in a mindless fashion, in that they are not able or willing to relax formal structures so that the 
authority for actions can flow. This is despite the adoption rationale being accepted across other 
strategic business units. The problem stems from a decentralised structure which makes it extremely 
hard for the project team to gain top management support. This presents risk to the organisation in 
terms of their 1SAP projects because a lack of managerial support may compromise the technologies 
successful assimilation enterprise wide. In fact a senior Accenture partner who has years of experience 
with SAP projects highlighted this point, stating that the two areas which are the key to reliable 
outcomes are senior management support and change management support, “these are the areas 
where things go really well or really badly.” In companies which have been successful in assimilating 
ERP enterprise wide, the CIO has the power to make strategic investment decisions. Conversely, it is 
evident that in this organisation the power for strategic planning lies in each of the business unit 
managers who report directly to the CEO. 
Part of the problem of gaining executive level buy-in is that there are no organisation incentives to get 
involved. Their performance is measured by sales throughput and volumes, not IT projects. They lack 
the knowledge or vision to understand the serious business impact that systems like ERP can have. 
The lack of business value placed on IT in the organisation is demonstrated by the fact that IT has no 
decision-making power or budget, because the power lies in the business unit. A consultant working 
on the project provides a great example of this problem: “The CFO was a big supporter to the CIO in 
the Industrial Markets unit and of the ERP project...when the CFO changed roles and went to a new 
strategic business unit, they no longer supported the project because there was no incentive-their 
shares and remuneration were tied to their business unit.” 
3.2.3 1SAP: know-how 
As a relatively late adopter of ERP systems the organisation has benefited from the rich resources 
which now exist around how to implement ERP systems (Swanson, 2003). Part of the reasoning which 
took place at the adoption stage seemed to have stemmed from management understanding of the 
difficulties associated with implementing ERP systems. The organisation benefited from the lessons 
learned from other ERP project disasters and took on board the risks associated with such projects. In 
that case a limited project scope (i.e. a limited number of SAP modules were selected) bound the 
project which eased the minds of the executives who were very happy to avoid any risks of failure.  
The organisation’s SLT were also mindful of the need to obtain external expertise in the form of 
consultants who had long standing experience with SAP implementations. They could also re-use 
employees who had worked on similar implementations in the other business units. For example unit 
B used employees who had worked on the NZ project. 
In terms of assimilation unit B has been somewhat successful, as a standalone implementation. 
Extensive efforts were made to get business buy in and involve different departments in the creation of 
power users who would help get all users on board. In this phase the culture of the organisation has 
presented some problems. Some department level managers were sceptical about the project and as 
such were not happy about their employees being removed to work on the project. In order for the 
project to be successfully assimilated the project team needed people who were fully dedicated to act 
as system champions. Due to the lack of support at a department level, the power users were not 
willing to dedicate 100% of their time to the project. This was due to the fact that their managers did 
not see the benefit in the system, and the power users felt they were jeopardising their future 
opportunities by being removed from their business unit. Unit B should have been mindful of the need 
to give authority to the project team or deliver stronger directives from an executive level in order to 
ensure successful assimilation.  
Whilst the unit B implementation has been successful and the change management approaches have 
helped assimilation to some extent (the Valley of Despair- an Accenture Concept to conceptualise 
productivity drops after go-live has been minimal), the adoption of ERP by other business units has 
not picked up. The success of the 1SAP project clearly lies in adoption know-why, in terms of the 
business benefits of adoption being perceived by the ELT as worthwhile to the organisation. 
It is clear from the preliminary case study findings that adoption know-why and implementation 
know-how both have degrees of impact on the outcomes of an ERP project. As a standalone project 
unit B has achieved successful outcomes, delivering the project on-time and on budget, a lot of which 
has come down to implementation know-how. However, taking an enterprise wide perspective the 
organisation’s ERP innovation has been less successful, due to the mindless decision making that has 
occurred. As Swanson and Wang (2005) demonstrate just because an organisation has implementation 
know-how does not guarantee the success of the project. What matters is that organisations are 
adopting such systems guided by the right business rationales. In other words the organisation needs to 
be more mindful in its comprehension and adoption of ERP systems. 
The next stage of the research will uncover managerial preference for the attributes driving these 
important strategic decisions. The purpose of this stage of research is to develop a framework of 
constructs and their relationships, in order to better understand the factors which are driving adoption 
know-why and implementation know-how and their associated weightings. The future application is 
being able to predict outcomes of the adoption process, given certain managerial preferences. The 
work has relevance to industry because it will highlight how managerial beliefs (formed through 
experiences, roles and bias) are affecting their large-scale technology investments and as such the 
research will help organisations to better manage the process of innovation from comprehension 
through to assimilation, ensuring reliable outcomes. 
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